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On the science-technology relationship:
a historical view
László Ropolyi
Several years ago I was fortunate to talk with a well-known philosopher of technology
about the science-technology relationship. He had a categorical view on the matter:
“It is simple. Science deals with facts, and technology deals with artefacts.” His
conceptualization was really attractive (and I realized it was of Aristotelian origin),1
and yet as a philosopher I was not completely satisfied. How can we uphold this view,
given that facts and artefacts are really di cult—if not impossible—to tell apart? On
a constructivist account, for instance, facts and artefacts seem to be indistinguishable.
He responded, smiling: “You should not be a constructivist then!”
But I am a constructivist—or at least I highly appreciate many constructivist
ideas. Having been trained in physics and in philosophy, my background was in
fact quite similar to that of Hans Radder. “To be frank, I should say that—from
an autobiographic point of view—I find all [this] empiricist metatalk rather embar-
rassing. I started my philosophical studies at the time of the decline of the logical
empiricist tradition. I thenwelcomed the subsequent postpositivist and constructivist
approaches.”2
In this context, I did not find the “simple” conceptualization of the science-
technology relationship offered by my prominent interlocutor satisfying at all.
 A clear distinction between natural things (“that […] exist by nature”) and other—
artificial—things (“which are not constituted by nature”) is a key issue in the Aristotelian
philosophy of nature. See e.g. Aristotle, he Physics with an English Translation, trans.
P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford, I–II. vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, and
London: Heinemann, ), b, vol. I. .
 Hans Radder, In and About the World. Philosophical Studies of Science and Technology,
(Albany: State University of New York Press, ), . Perhaps an autobiographic note is
in order here. Hans and I had not only the intellectual environment in common but many
other aspects of our life as well. Our similar living and cultural contextsmade it possible for
us to form a kind of intellectual “peerness” and a personal friendship in the last two-three
decades, which is a continuous source of pleasure forme.he ideas developed in this paper
I dedicate to Hans.
Published in: Building Bridges. Connecting Science, Technology an
d Philosophy. Eds.: H. de Regt and C. Kwa, VU University Press, 
Amsterdam, 2014. pp. 175-187.
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It is clear that the problem of the science-technology relationship cannot be solved
on an empirical basis only. An appropriate philosophical position is needed instead.3
At the second glance, however, it seems to be also obvious that all the factors that
need to be considered here, as well as their interrelationships, have undergone sig-
nificant historical changes, and therefore, the science-technology relationship cannot
be properly analyzed without reflecting on the history of science, on the history of
technology, on the history of philosophy, or on cultural history at least. Unfortu-
nately, in current scholarship there are hardly any commonhistorical analyses of these
issues, apart from some studies on technoscience which emerged over the last two
decades.4
In this paper I shall take into account both philosophical and historical arguments
so as to develop a conceptualization of the science-technology relationship. Not
surprisingly, I will arrive at an (historically informed) concept of technoscience.
It is perhaps surprising that I should base my argument about the nature of the
science-technology relationship on human history and/or cultural history rather than
on the history of various scientific disciplines. I propose that in order to understand
the relationship between science, technology, and philosophy, it su ces to consider
the sequence in which they emerged in the course of human history; other aspects of
the history of these various cultural entities are of secondary importance.
he birth of science and the birth of philosophy are well-known and frequently
discussed topics. But the situation changes radically when it comes to technology.
On the one hand, it is not easy to study the early forms of technologies;5 on the
other hand, unlike in the case of early philosophy and science, there is no consensus
 Radder, In and About the World, –; Hans Radder, “Science, Technology, and the
Science-Technology Relationship” in Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences,
ed. A.W.M. Meijers (Amsterdam: Elsevier, ), –; and Hans Radder, he Material
Realization of Science. From Habermas to Experimentation and Referential Realism, (Dor-
drecht: Heidelberg: New York: London: Springer, ), –.
 See e.g. the papers in the volume , nos. . and  of Perspectives on Science, especially
Barry Barnes, “Elusive Memories of Technoscience,” Perspectives on Science  ():
–; Ursula Klein, “Technoscience avant la lettre,” Perspectives on Science  ():
–; John Pickstone, “On Knowing, Acting, and the Location of Technoscience: A
Response to Barry Barnes,” Perspectives on Science  (): –. See moreover John
Pickstone, Ways of Knowing. A New History of Science, Technology and Medicine (Chicago:
he University of Chicago Press, ).
 See e.g. the problem of papyrophobic technology vs. papyrocentric science in Derek J. de
Solla Price, “he Parallel Structures of Science and Technology,” in Science in Context.
Readings in the Sociology of Science, eds. Barry Barnes and David Edge (Milton Keynes:
he Open University Press, ), –.
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among historians as to what constitutes technology, i.e. how to define technology
in a way that will help identify and interpret it in all stages of its development,
from primitive forms to modern versions. In other words, identifying the birth of
technology involves philosophical problems, and these problems are intertwinedwith
the problem of defining technology. In this essay, I shall propose a novel concept of
technology, one that encompasses all forms of technology, from the most primitive
human practices to Internet usage, from the beginning of human history to the
present.
he central claims of the paper—all of which are based on considerations regard-
ing the historical emergence and development of technology, science, and philos-
ophy—may be formulated as follows:
hesis one asserts the primacy of technology. his is based on the fact that the
emergence of technology in human history preceded the emergence of philosophy
and of science.
hesis two claims that there is no science without philosophy. Historically, (Euro-
pean) philosophy emerged several hundred years before science did; science does
not exist without (or prior to) philosophy.
hesis three proposes that science equals to technology plus philosophy. his
implies that the coexistence of technology and philosophy is prerequisite for the
emergence of science.
Technology as an aspect of human praxis
So as to meet the objective of this paper, which is to arrive at a conceptualization
of the science-technology relationship in general, a rather special concept of tech-
nology is needed. In particular, the concept of technology must be broad enough to
include technology in all its historical forms, primitive tool-making as well as recent
information technologies. No doubt this is an “essentialist” or “substantivist” view
on technology,6 since only an essentialist view is capable of accounting for the fea-
tures that protean historical forms of technology have in common, and hence of
 See e.g. Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, ); Hans
Radder, “Critical Philosophy of Technology: he Basic Issues”, Social Epistemology 
(): –; Andreas Beinsteiner, “Das Wesen der Technik: Relating Heidegger’s Phi-
losophy of Technology to Media Studies” (paper presented at the Hermeneutics of Science
and Technology—A Reconsideration. th Anniversary Conference of the ISHS, Vienna,
Austria—Budapest, Hungary, July –August , ).
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identifying the point in time when technology was born. However, instead of follow-
ing in Heidegger’s or Ellul’s footsteps, I propose a different philosophy of technology
based on a more universal concept of technology.7
I propose that the essence of technology is a specific form or aspect of human
agency, the realization of the human control over a technological situation. In con-
sequence of the deployment of this human agency, the course and the outcome of
the situation are no longer governed by natural constraints but by specific human
goals. he human control of technological situations yields artificial beings as out-
comes. Since technological situations vary and they are not homogeneous in nature,
they can be identified on the basis of their constituents. he components that make
up a technological situation are a set of (natural or artificial) beings, humans (or
human agencies), their aims, and (situation-bound) tools. In Hegel’s words, the
essence of technology necessarily appears in concrete, particular technologies only,
while on the other hand, all technologies necessarily embody the essence of technol-
ogy.
According to this view, every element of the human world is created with the
help of technologies. Both human nature and social being are the products of our
technological activity, and their characteristics are determined by the specificities of
the technologies we use to produce them.
In comparison with widely accepted views on technology, this view implies an
extremely general and abstract conceptualization of technological praxis. In particu-
lar, all human praxis appears as technological, or better said, as having a technolog-
ical aspect or dimension. he view on technology proposed above is therefore really
close to a philosophy or theory of human actions. Human practice consists of the—
imperfect—realization of human control over a situation.Human practice is of course
not identical with technological praxis, as the former has several other aspects as well,
but it always and necessarily has a technological aspect too. Moreover, every human
situation can be regarded as a technological situation, every human being as a tech-
nological agent, every human goal as accomplishable by a specific technology, and
every human tool as a situation-bound technological tool. he technological aspect
of human practice is a response to human vulnerability and expresses the intention
to gain control over the situations of our lives. Without such an—evidently partial—
 More details can be found in my Hungarian book: László Ropolyi, Az Internet természete.
Internetfilozófiai értekezés (On the nature of the Internet. A discourse on the philosophy of
the Internet) (Budapest: Typotex, ), –. A drat version of its English translation is
available online: László Ropolyi, “Philosophy of the Internet. A Discourse on the Nature
of the Internet,” last modified December , , http://elte.prompt.hu/sites/default/files/
tananyagok/philosophy_of_internet/index.html
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success we would cease to be human beings; we would take part in natural situations
as natural—animal—beings. For this reason, every technology is a technology of
humanity: the human beings, the humanworld, cultures and societies are all products
of technologies. Further, technology is the only way humans can create themselves.
Technology was born together with human beings. Various branches of technology
can be associated with various types of life situations. Our self-creating praxis is facil-
itated by a range of economic, legal, psychic, social, cultural, material, mechanical,
etc. technologies.
Inmy view, engineering is ameta-technological activity, a specific practice of han-
dling the components of technological situations, which aims to set up controllable
situations in a given, complex, infinitely extending environment.
In spite of some fundamental differences with respect to goals, vocabulary, philo-
sophical background, crucial components, and complexity of elaboration, the above
described view on technology and Radder’s theory of technology8 havemuch in com-
mon. Radder describes technology as a “(type of) artefactual, functional system with
a certain degree of stability and reproducibility” and in a subtle analysis he consid-
ers “the question of how we may successfully realize and maintain such technologies,
which […] reveal a number of equally important characteristics of technologies.”9
Both views accord a crucial role to “human intervention” on a set of beings sur-
rounded with an environment, with intervention resulting in material and symbolic
artefacts, etc. Although Radder’s analysis is interesting, significant, and highly com-
plex, it is hard to see how it may help elucidate the nature of the technology-science
relationship. It is perhaps no accident that in his paper on the science-technology rela-
tionship, Radder does not refer to his own theory of technology.10 he view proposed
here is hopefully more useful for this purpose.
Given the above conceptualization of technology, it is evident that technology
has primacy over intellectual practices such as doing philosophy or doing science.
his is because being a human is prerequisite for being a philosopher or for being
a scientist. Evidently, there is no philosophy or science without specific, historically
determined technological practices. In other words: philosophy and science (as well
as any other field of human culture) necessarily rely on and thus include technological
components.
his view, combined with Feenberg’s comparative analysis of the philosophies
of technology11 yields the insight that technology is not autonomous from humans
 Radder, “Critical Philosophy of Technology.”
 Radder “Critical Philosophy of Technology,” .
 Radder, “Science, Technology, and the Science-Technology Relationship.”
 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, .
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or from society, and it is not value-free either. It is embedded, practically and
culturally, in the social system and in the human life-world—and we may hope for
a Habermasian synthesis of these two context-dependencies.
he technology-science-philosophy relationship
One consequence of the above proposed philosophy of technology is the following
thesis: science equals to technology plus philosophy.
he ‘science = technology + philosophy’ formula is not my invention, although
I am unable to identify its originator. I stumbled across it in a message sent as a
contribution to an online discussion on a discussion list.12 As far as I can remember,
the author of this contribution wrote: “as everybody knows, science = technology
+ philosophy”. he statement came as a complete surprise to me, and this in spite
of my long practice in doing and teaching philosophy of science. As I realized
later, my astonishment was due to the fact that philosophical reflection on science,
technology, and philosophy are usually performed in isolation, published in different
journals by different scholars working in different intellectual traditions and oten in
different disciplines, without any serious consideration of the scholarship produced
in the other two fields. In consequence, the philosophy of science, the philosophy
of technology, and philosophy proper have effectively become separate fields under
the sway of the positivist meta-methodology of intellectual activity. Accepting this
methodology makes it nearly impossible to consider these fields in relation to each
other, or even to conceive of the possibility of their interrelatedness.
As I began to reflect on these problems, I gradually became aware ofmy own intel-
lectual situation. I recalled my earlier impression that the positivist methodologies
had lost their lure, giving way to alternative methodologies such as various post-
positivist trends in the philosophy of science, hermeneutic and constructivist views of
science and technology, the postmodern condition, and so on. I realized that this ide-
ological rearrangement resulted in these newer approaches to science and technology
being cultivated under the names of sociology of knowledge, social constructivism,
social epistemology, and hermeneutics of science and technology, while in a parallel
move, the traditional domains of reality, their borders, and the borders separating the
scientific disciplines which study them were reinterpreted. I also discovered a newly
 Unfortunately, I cannot remember the names of the discussants or the topic. I surmise that
the discussion took place in  on the HOPOS-L, technology, sts, or the philosop list or
on some other such list. I could not however locate the statement in my archives of the
aforementioned lists.
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established approach called technoscience, where science and technology are regarded
to be almost inseparable from each other, with their most important characteristics
being part of the same ontological and epistemological universe. he prevalent view
in postmodern cultural studies is that science and technology are integral and hardly
separable components of the culture of an age; their content significantly overlaps
with that of other cultural domains and entities, including social interests and values,
philosophies, religions, art, or even popular culture.
Under these intellectual conditions, it is only natural to reflect on the interrelation-
ships between science, technology, and philosophy; moreover, such an inquiry seems
to be extremely important and fruitful. Following this insight, I started to study these
exciting problems and found it necessary to consider some fundamental aspects of
the ‘science = technology + philosophy’ thesis and what it implies for the analysis of
science, technology, and philosophy.
he thesis is a formal statement of the interrelatedness of science, technology, and
philosophy, which requires some interpretation. A “strong” interpretation emerges
if the components of the thesis are represented on a Venn diagram: science then
appears as the intersection of technology and philosophy. his reveals two impor-
tant aspects of the science-technology-philosophy relationship: first, that only some,
and not all, elements of technology and philosophy are incorporated into science; and
second, that science is essentially heterogeneous, containing both technological and
philosophical components. he “weaker” interpretation highlights the second claim:
everything scientific includes something technological and something philosophi-
cal. In the remainder of this paper, I shall confine myself to this weaker interpreta-
tion.
By rearranging the formula, we may obtain further versions of the thesis, each
of which sheds light on and emphasizes different aspects of the science-technology-
philosophy relationship. he classical version (science = technology + philosophy)
gives us insight into the nature of science. he formula ‘science—technology = phi-
losophy’ (science minus technology equals to philosophy) discloses the ideologi-
cal role played by science and calls attention to the fact that philosophical prin-
ciples are constitutive of science. he formula ‘science—philosophy = technology’
(science minus philosophy equals to technology) is useful for the understanding
of the so-called “technicization” of the sciences, as well as for the conceptualiza-
tion of what is called “applied” science. Just as the three versions of the formula
are helpful in understanding various aspects of science, they might just as well be
used as points of departure for similar analyses of philosophy or of technology.
Folding out all these implications is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, so I
shall continue to focus on the “classical” formula and on what it implies for sci-
ence.
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Historical considerations concerning the sequence of the emergence of science,
technology, and philosophy constitute an historical argument for the ‘science =
philosophy + technology’ thesis. Technologies are the oldest components of culture,
while philosophy and science emerged in a relatively late period of the human
history. On the other hand, science emerged a few hundred years ater philosophy.
here were no sciences without and prior to effective technologies and existing
philosophies.
Earlier in the paper, I claimed that this sequence of emergence of the respective
cultural entities establish the primacy of technology over science and philosophy. I
argued that the validity of the primacy of technology thesis is rooted in human beings’
need to control their living environment for the sake of survival. he essence of tech-
nology is the effective control of a situation. Making and using tools serve this goal.
Since any tool is a tool in a given situation only, tool-making requires some interpre-
tation on the part of the tool-maker. Tool-making is therefore a kind of hermenutical
praxis, the creation of artifacts based on the situation-bound (re)interpretation of
natural beings. Every version of technology, from primitive human techniques to
present-day computer technology, gains control over a technological situation with
the help of situation-bound knowledge the scope of which normally does not extend
beyond the particular situation at hand.
here is one more historical argument concerning the emergence of philosophy
in the ancient time. It is well-known that the birth of philosophy preceded the birth
of science in Ancient Greece, as well as in every other parts of the world. he second
thesis of this paper expressed this relationship saying that there is no science without
philosophy.
Philosophy is completely different from technology. Since its inception, the useful-
ness of philosophy has been frequently debated. Philosophy is not very useful in con-
trolling situations; as a source of uncertainty, it may even impede the achievement of
this goal.he aim of philosophy is to explore situations, not to control them. It aims at
disclosing the ultimate truths. Making and using concepts serve this goal. he essen-
tial practices of conceptual thinking are questioning, reflecting, and critical thinking.
A prerequsitie for these activities is the recognition of the lack of certainty, which
makes the production of philosophical ideas an endless process. Further, the scope
of validity of a philosophical idea is the entire world: philosophy seeks to understand
how and why the world became the way it is. In short, every version of philosophy
constructs worlds with the help of universal (not situation-bound) knowledge.
Science accepts, includes, uses, combines, cultivates and improves numerous
aspects of the controversial natures of technology and philosophy. In comparison
with technology, science is useless for practical purposes and is thus inferior; in
comparison with philosophy, it is limited, restricted, and praxis-bound. Science
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includes both situation-bound experiences and universal principles and laws. It does
not build or control real-life situations, but rather discovers and creates conceptual
systems. Because it is oriented towards survival or effectiveness, technology is focused
on the present (hic et nunc) instead of the past and the future. Whereas survival
is something that poses tasks to be solved “here and now”, critical thinking and
reflexivity have space-time needs. herefore, technology is finite while philosophy
is infinite; if technology is punctuated, then philosophy is a line, and science is a
segment. Philosophy constructs worlds for science using technological situations
as building blocks. Scientific knowledge is about knowing how, knowing what and
knowing why.
In short, the human control over technological situations and the creation and
use of tools, i.e. any technological praxis is situation-bound. But the characteristics of
science are very different—the opposite in fact: science aims at situation-independent
(universal) knowledge, one that is valid across a range of situations (optimally in
all situations). his invites the question how is it possible to construct universal
claims on the basis of a technological praxis every element of which is necessarily
situation-bound. he answer is this: with the help of philosophical principles and
ideas. Philosophy is capable of creating worlds out of situations. Consequently, the
combination of certain elements of technological and philosophical praxis results in
scientific praxis.
In philosophy, there are many different ways of world-making. Perhaps the most
popular one is the Platonic way, i.e. world-making by “justification”. Plato defines
knowledge as justified true belief/opinion (doxa), providing a clear connection and
a distinction between belief and knowledge. he Aristotelian way of world-making
(world-making by “inquiry for causes”) is better suited for our purposes. ForAristotle,
knowledge is the knowledge of causes. Aristotle makes a connection and distinc-
tion between knowing (being acquainted with something) and knowledge. Know-
ing means knowing the contingent, whereas knowledge is knowing the necessary.
Another distinctionmade byAristotle is that between epistêmê and technê, i.e. knowl-
edge of things created by nature vs. knowledge of things created by cratsman, or, in
other words: the knowledge of natural vs. artificial beings.13
We may use the above mentioned Aristotelian ideas and principles to make a
clear connection and distinction between technology and science. Technology is a
human praxis based on an ability called “technê” (knowing, a situation-bound art
of creation) by the ancients, which is effective in concrete situations, and which
 See e. g. Richard Parry, “Episteme and Techne”, In he Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall  Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified Oct , . http://plato.stanford
.edu/archives/fall/entries/episteme-techne/
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Table . A comparison of science and technology
Science Technology
Beings “given by nature” Artificial beings
“Epistêmê” “Technê”
Knowing the necessary (knowledge) Knowing the contingent
To know why To know how
Abstract and universal laws Concrete and particular rules
Situation-independent truth Situation-bound validity
Eternal and global Temporal and local
Unified Plural
Contemplative Reasonable
Focus on reality Focus on potentiality
Truth Effectiveness
“Dezanthropomorphic” “Anthropomorphic”
Created by a “philosopher” Created by a “cratsman”
aims at knowing contingent relationships. Exploiting its effective control, technology
sustains artificial situations and creates artificial beings including cultures, social
structures, personalities, artifacts, etc. Science is a different human praxis based on
an ability called “epistêmê” (knowledge, a situation-independent art of consideration),
knowledge which is valid in every situation, and which aims at discovering necessary
(e.g. causal) relationships. Enjoying its contemplative freedom, science compares as
many concrete situations as are available. It studies the world of given (by nature,
culture, society, etc.) beings, and creates necessarily interrelated conceptual systems
to describe and explain reality, including nature, culture, social andmental structures,
etc. Due to the ontological and historical primacy of technology to science, the origin
and the toolkit of the former appears as “natural”. It is however unclear where science
comes from, how it could separate from technology, how it was able to make the
breakthrough from contingency to necessity, and so on. he answer, in short, is that
all of these changes were the outcome of interactions between ancient technology
and ancient philosophy. In a few hundred years, the results of these interactions
stabilized, giving rise to a new cultural entity: science. Since then, the organizing
principles and the most fundamental characteristics of this entity have remained the
same, and we can summarize them in the form of the equation ‘science = technology
+ philosophy’.
here is no room here for further arguments; however, the history of technology
and the history of the formation of various scientific disciplines provide ample
illustration for the validity of this conclusion. Table  presents and contrasts further
characteristics of science and technology.
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If technology and science differ, or are even the opposites of each other in somany
respects, then how come they are interconnected? How is the relationship between
them established? he answer is: it is philosophy that connects the two sides, or, more
precisely: philosophical generalizations transform the technological characteristics
into scientific ones. Different philosophies construct different sciences out of the same
set of technological situations. Historical, social, and personal variants of scientific
disciplines, practices, methodologies, ideas, interpretations, etc. are the results of
the application of different philosophical ideas and principles to the case at hand.
Identifying the philosophical content—and its origin—underlying these variants
is the business of the philosophy of science. I now would like to mention a few
illustrations for this claim.
he crucial methodological problem is how we can create a world (for science)
from the separate situations (of technology)? According to a naive, but popular
philosophical world-construction, the world is a simple collection of situations, i.e.
world = situation() + situation() + … + situation(n),
where n is finite or infinite, depending on philosophical preferences. Needless to
say, there are many more sophisticated world-making methodologies in philoso-
phy, but this simple version will do for my purposes, which is to demonstrate the
double nature of scientific experimentation.When doing science, scientists try to cre-
ate new situations (these are sometimes called experimental situations) so as to test
scientific claims. In this way, the goals of experimentation are scientific (situation-
independent), but their means are technological (situation-bound).14
Based on the thesis, the relation between the concepts of scientific models and
theories can be easily described: ‘model + philosophy = theory’. hat is to say, a sci-
entific theory is a situation-independent model created via philosophically motivated
interpretation.
he relation of knowledge and power has been always an important question for
every age. On the account proposed here, the Baconian idea “knowledge is power”
has a very specific meaning, namely, that in the modern era science has a highly
technological and hierarchical character. In general, technology is acquainted with
power, while science is not, being a contemplative and democratic practice (where
democracy refers to the democracy of situations in the first place). Problems like this
play an important role in the modern-postmodern transition and in its descriptions
by Heidegger, Habermas, Lyotard and others.
 I think these ideas are in line with Hans Radder’s thoroughgoing analysis of scientific
experimentation presented in he Material Realization of Science.
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Beside the usual (subject-level) reflection on science (i.e., on the subject-field of
the discipline in question), we may also reflect on scientific activity itself (i.e., on
the methodological problems of the sciences). his meta-level reflection addresses
questions like: what is the technology of making good science? Differentiating this
meta-level analysis, we may speak about meta-technology, meta-philosophy and
meta-science, and address the question of their interrelatedness just as we did on
the subject level. Recent trends in the philosophy of science and technology, techno-
science, science studies, etc. combine the elements of meta-technology, meta-science
and meta-philosophy in various ways—oten without reflecting on the activity of
doing the combination. (In principle, there are an infinite number of meta-levels, but
in (philosophical) practice, not all of them are attended to). Many debates in the phi-
losophy of science and related disciplines revolve around reaching the right kind of
balance between these constituents of meta-culture.
I would like to conclude the paperwith calling attention to threemore implications
of the ‘science = technology + philosophy’ thesis. First, sciences are oten “techni-
calized”, meaning that their philosophical dimensions are disregarded or eliminated.
Technicalization may also take a weaker form, that of an excessive emphasis on epis-
temology to the detriment of ontology. In both cases, the underlying motivation is
the perceived need for an ideology-free science. (According to our analysis, there is
of course no such thing). On the other hand, the fragmented world of the postmod-
ern age leads to the emergence of postmodern science, which is a very technicized
one, like computer and information science and technology.
If on the other hand it is the technological constituents that are eliminated
from science, the complicated role of philosophy in scientific praxis becomes more
salient.he scandalous Heideggerian statement that “science does not think”15 can be
interpreted as a straightforward implication of our thesis: technicized science indeed
does not think, but true science (that which includes philosophical components)
does. Normal science—in the Kuhnian sense of the term—does not think (although
normal scientists do), only revolutionary science does.
Lastly, the thesis has important consequences for the concept of technoscience. On
the account proposed here, all science is technoscience; there is no science without
technological components. On the other hand, all science is philoscience as well; there
is no science whichwould not include philosophical principles.Whenwe speak about
“science”, unqualified, this inner structure of scientific knowledge remains obscured.
It is always a fusion of technological and philosophical components that results in
the formation of a “scientific matter”, i.e., a concrete socio-historical form of science.
 See Martin Heidegger, What Is Called hinking? (New York: Harper & Row, ).
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he relative weight of technological and philosophical components in the mixture,
and the level of their integration are challenges to be taken up by the history and
philosophy of science and technology, and by further studies on the interrelatedness
of technology, science, and philosophy.
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